HM the Emperor Commemorates the End of World War II

70 years ago today HM the Showa Emperor announced the end of hostilities and acceptance of the Allied demands, bringing the Second World War to an end. Their Majesties the Emperor and Empress attended a special ceremony at the Nippon Bukodan hall in the Chiyoda Ward of Tokyo which was attended by 6,517 people. There was a moment of silence at noon in solemn commemoration of the people killed in the war and all those who lost loved ones in the massive conflict. More than three million Japanese people died because of the war. The number of survivors has been dwindling rapidly in recent years so that, this year, only 14 war widows were present for the ceremony.

His Majesty the Emperor said, "On this day to commemorate the war dead and pray for peace, my thoughts are with the people who lost their precious lives in the last war and their bereaved families," His Majesty also said, "Reflecting on our past and bearing in mind the feelings of deep remorse over the last war, I earnestly hope that the ravages of war will never be repeated," Heartfelt sentiments that everyone can agree on.

Some government officials marked the occasion by visiting Yasukuni Shrine where all those who lost their lives in the service of the Emperor are memorialized. Former Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara visited the shrine and stated that he would like for HM the Emperor to do so as well. The current Emperor has never visited Yasukuni Shrine though other members of the Imperial Family have made offerings there on his behalf. Prime Minister Abe did not visit the shrine this year due to the habit of the Chinese and Korean governments of trying to make an international incident out of every such visit. However, another government official made offerings at the shrine on behalf of Mr. Abe and stated that the Prime Minister's feelings about Yasukuni Shrine and his gratitude toward the Japanese war dead have not changed.

Two Enemies Who Saved Each Other

The picture above shows Manuel Roxas of the Philippines and Colonel Nobuhiko Jimbo of the Imperial Japanese Army who was part of the forces that occupied The Philippines during the Second World War. These two men began and ended the conflict on opposite sides and yet each man owed the other his life. Manuel Roxas was a prominent leader in The Philippines before the war, serving for twelve years as the Speaker of the House of Representatives. When the United States of America agreed to grant independence to The Philippines, Roxas served in the convention to draw up the constitution for the new country and he served as Secretary of Finance along with other positions and was a brigadier general in the Filipino army. Elected to the Senate, he was unable to take his seat because of the outbreak of war and when Japanese forces attacked the Philippines he was made liaison officer between the armies of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the United States of America. Eventually, of course, the American and Filipino forces were defeated by the Japanese troops under the noble General Masaharu Homma and finally surrendered. Roxas was among those taken prisoner.

This was a time of great pain and suffering. General Homma gave orders to treat the Filipinos as brothers and forbid any acts of cruelty, however, there were others who were hate-filled and who did horrible things, sometimes on orders they had forged in General Homma's name. Whenever the general found out about such things, he had the guilty officers reprimanded. A few weeks after the surrender, General Manuel Roxas was taken prisoner and the local Japanese commander, General Torao Ikuta, received an order to execute him. General Ikuta was also an honorable man and was greatly distressed at being given such an order. He sent the order on to a subordinate officer, Colonel Nobuhiko Jimbo. As it happened, Colonel Jimbo was another example of an upright officer. He was also a Catholic, the same as Roxas, and was disgusted by the very idea of murdering him, regardless of military orders which seemed to be genuine. He struggled with his conscience as he was transporting the prisoners.

Roxas and a local governor were both taken by Colonel Jimbo to be executed but the governor pleaded for his life and Colonel Jimbo bravely determined that he could not and would not execute the two men. He went personally to General Ikuta to urge him to spare the two men, regardless of what orders had been issued. It would be barbaric and such orders, he reasoned, had to be some sort of mistake. General Ikuta quickly agreed and had the prisoners hidden away. However, an officer soon arrived from Manila demanding that the executions be carried out and that Colonel Jimbo be court-martialed for his efforts to save their lives. Again, showing great courage and character, Colonel Jimbo was still not prepared to give up and traveled to Manila himself to confront General Homma directly. General Homma was not in his office when Jimbo arrived but he spoke to Homma’s chief of staff who could not believe that the general would give such an order. Jimbo handed him the document which the Chief of Staff suspended and immediately and then confronted the junior general he suspected of being responsible for the false order.

When General Homma returned to his headquarters and learned of the whole situation, he immediately countermanded the execution of Roxas and personally thanked Colonel Jimbo for his brave stand in the cause of justice and humanity. He told the colonel that he would be sure to mention his actions when he returned home and gave his report to the Emperor. Roxas would go on to be the first President of The Philippines after the war. General Homma, however, was not allowed to make his report to the Emperor as his enemies within the army succeeded in having him relieved of command and sent home. Not being allowed to report to the Emperor, as was customary, was done as a sign of his semi-disgrace. He was an unjust action for a general so talented, dedicated and honorable as General Homma. Worse was to come, however, as after the war, General Homma was returned to The Philippines where he was convicted and executed as a war criminal; a case so blatantly unjust that even a number of very prominent Americans spoke out against it and harshly condemned their own countrymen for participating in such a disgraceful act.

The upright Colonel Nobuhiko Jimbo almost suffered a similar fate. He had been transferred to China and was himself arrested at the end of the conflict as a potential "war criminal". In 1946, Filipino President Roxas, however, learned that Colonel Jimbo was being held in prison in northern China awaiting trial and he acted to return the favor the colonel had done in saving his life. Roxas wrote personally to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, explaining the situation and asking that Colonel Jimbo be given amnesty. The Chinese leader agreed and the following year Colonel Jimbo was released and returned to Japan. He had survived but only because of the timely intervention of the man whose life he had saved. If Roxas had not found out about Jimbo in time, he mostly likely would have been executed in the wave of anti-Japanese hysteria in China in the aftermath of the war. These two men, one Filipino, one Japanese, had started and ended the war on opposite sides and yet each had saved the life of the other. While many seem to enjoy remembering only the cruel and sad events of the war, more emphasis should be given to remembering those like Colonel Jimbo Nobuhiko who risked everything to save the life of one man.

General Kuribayashi Tadamichi 栗林忠道

The man who led one of the most iconic and fierce struggles in the latter days of the Empire of Japan was General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, an accomplished soldier, writer and diplomat who had a level of understanding of the enemy Japan faced that most of his fellow officers did not. He was born on July 7, 1891 in Hanishina District, Nagano Prefecture to an old samurai family. Given his family background, a military career was only natural for Kuribayashi, though in his early days at school he was most known for literary talents as a writer of speeches, poetry and inspirational works. He was also known for being somewhat rebellious and was almost expelled from school for organizing a students strike. In fact, he had initially planned on becoming a journalist but was finally persuaded by his instructors to attend the Imperial Japanese Army Academy after graduating from Nagano High School in 1911. He graduated in 1914 as a cavalry officer and went on to the Army Cavalry School in 1918 to further perfect his skills. He showed such promise that he went on to the Army War College and had an outstanding record, graduating in 1923 with high praise and receiving the coveted military saber from His Majesty the Taisho Emperor of Japan.

In 1928 Kuribayashi was sent as a deputy military attaché to the United States in Washington DC and during his two year stay in America he studied at Harvard University. He gained a valuable perspective there and was most impressed by the massive economic and industrial strength of the United States. He later said that, in his travels around the country, “…I knew the close connections between the military and industry. I saw the plant area of Detroit, too. By one button push, all the industries will be mobilized for military business.” Later he held a similar post in Canada but it was his time in the United States that gave him a first-hand understanding of the enemy Japan would ultimately face in World War II. He was one of the few Japanese military figures who understood just how massively outmatched Japan would be in any war with the United States and hoped that such a thing could be avoided. After returning from Canada, he served on the General Staff in Tokyo, continued to do some writing and by 1940 had been promoted to major general. When war broke out in December of 1941 he was serving as chief of staff of the 23rd Army tasked with the conquest of Hong Kong.

When the war came, Kuribayashi was one of the few men in the Japanese military who understood what the consequences would be. On numerous occasions he had said to his family that, “America is the last country in the world Japan should fight”. This, combined with his occasional remarks supportive of a negotiated peace, led some of the more radical militarists to accuse him of being a defeatist and lacking in support for the Japanese war effort. However, Kuribayashi was as loyal and committed a soldier as Japan ever had and his views were based on his understanding of American military might. He knew that it was a war that would be virtually impossible for Japan to win given the overwhelming American superiority in resources, manpower, economic and industrial output compared to Japan. Others had the bare facts but Kuribayashi had actually seen it for himself and fully grasped just how massive the imbalance was between Japan and America and he did not want to see the Empire of Japan wiped out in a war in which there was practically no chance of success. Nonetheless, once that decision was made, he was absolutely committed to doing his duty and would fight the Americans with the utmost of his abilities.

During the war, General Kuribayashi gained the reputation of being a ‘soldier’s general’. He visited his wounded men in the hospital, something which was rare at the time, showed great concern for keeping his troops properly supplied and was determined not to waste their lives needlessly. In 1943 he was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of a training division with the Imperial Guard and the following year was given the field command of the 109th Division. A few days later he was informed that he would be tasked with the defense of the island of Iwo Jima and was even granted an imperial audience before being flown to the island to assume command. When Kuribayashi arrived on Iwo Jima he already had a plan in mind for how to inflict a costly defeat on the Americans. However, he had been kept in the dark about the overall strategic situation for Japan and did not know, at the time, that he was essentially being sent to certain death with the assignment. The plan Kuribayashi had was of a type that would have been familiar to someone like American General George Patton. His idea was to set up a defense in-depth in the interior of Iwo Jima to lure in as many Americans as possible and pin them down with withering fire at which time the Imperial Japanese Navy Combined Fleet would swing in from the sea and Kuribayashi and the navy would crush the Americans between them.

After arriving, Kuribayashi told Major Yoshitaka Horie, “When the enemy comes here, we can contain him, and then our Combined Fleet will come to slap his face. That is to say, our role here is a massive containing action.” However, Horie then informed him of recent events that Kuribayashi did not know about. The Combined Fleet had been practically annihilated at the Battle of the Philippine Sea only ten days before and the Imperial Japanese Navy would never launch a major offensive operation again. Additionally, Japanese naval air power had been wiped out as well with over 5-600 aircraft destroyed. Kuribayashi had been unaware of any of this and only upon learning of it did he realize that there was practically no hope for a Japanese victory on Iwo Jima. Still, it was his duty to try and that is what he would do. He inspected the defenses of the island himself, laid out new defensive positions and determined to fight on Iwo Jima regardless of the odds against him and to kill as many Americans as possible. His only hope was that if he could inflict horrendous losses on the American forces, the public in the United States might lose morale and be more agreeable to abandoning the war and making peace with Japan.

This was the only option Kuribayashi had and his reasoning was sound. However, the nature of World War II in the Pacific for the United States meant that it would not work. This, after all, is something that would happen to American overseas conflicts yet to come and which most people today are familiar with. However, this is partly exactly why President Roosevelt was adamant that Japan strike the first blow in bringing the United States into the war. That event galvanized the public and ensured that the mentality of the American people would be different than it would be in later conflicts such as the war in Vietnam for example. In a war that America chose to fight, even for laudable reasons, extreme loss of life could be enough to cause public support for the war to drop and force the government to pull out and end hostilities. However, in this case, because Japan had attacked American territory, regardless of the reasons, that was not going to happen in World War II. Losses in the Pacific islands campaign would be extreme for the United States but support for the war would never drop but a greater ferocity encouraged. That is not to say though that General Kuribayashi was wrong in his decision. Under the circumstances there was no other decision he could make other than to surrender without fighting at all.

Any Japanese strategy in the island campaigns were crippled from the outset by American naval superiority. Even if Japan had inflicted devastating losses on American forces, even to the extent of forcing the enemy off of an island like Iwo Jima, would have been only temporary setbacks for the United States which could have simply bypassed such islands, keeping them from being re-supplied until the Japanese garrison was forced to surrender or die of starvation. This was similar to the strategy used by General Douglas MacArthur of bypassing strong points and attacking weak points, leaving heavily fortified areas to wither in isolation. Unlike warfare on land, when it came to the Pacific islands, everything depended on maintaining naval superiority which, in turn, also guaranteed air superiority so that there was no way an island garrison could fight a war of attrition against an enemy that controlled the seas and skies around the combat area. Kuribayashi surely understood this but he was determined to do the best he could in an extremely difficult situation. As long as the Americans were intent on taking Iwo Jima he could at least delay the American offensive and buy time for the major, most heavily populated Japanese home islands. Every day he held out was one more day before American forces could invade Honshu or increase the bombing of the Japanese heartland.

General Kuribayashi made the best of a bad situation and learned from previous Japanese defeats to mount a more successful defense. Accepted thinking, in resisting an amphibious assault, was to put your strength up front and try to stop the enemy on the beaches when they were the least organized and the most vulnerable. However, General Kuribayashi decided against this. On Saipan, Guam and Tinian he had seen this tactic fail because of American naval superiority. Anything he placed on the beaches would be pulverized by the American battleships offshore so, instead, he placed his men farther inland in an intricate network of underground fortifications. Taking those fortifications would be a long, bloody and frustrating affair for the attacking Americans. Kuribayashi also knew that he could expect no help from Japan and he had to use his men and supplies conservatively. Lack of food, water and the prevalence of sickness because of a lack of proper supplies was a major problem for the Japanese from the outset. On February 19, 1945 the first elements of the U.S. Marines began landing on Iwo Jima. Because of the great care and preparations taken by General Kuribayashi, it would be a grueling affair for the American forces, lasting five weeks and ultimately costing the American forces over 6,000 killed and over 19,000 wounded. The Japanese garrison of just over 22,000 men generally fought to the death with only 216 being captured.

General Kuribayashi ordered his men not to fire on the Americans as they came ashore but to draw them in close and then fight fiercely to the last man and urged his troops to set as their goal to kill at least 10 Americans before giving up their life. Given the popular perception of the war in the Pacific, it is important to note that General Kuribayashi did not favor what Americans called the “banzai charge”. The aggressive temperament of Japanese warriors repeatedly led them, in other battles, to launch suicidal charges when the situation became desperate. However, this meant that they would be out in the open and thus easily wiped out by superior American firepower. What Kuribayashi did was far more effective, urging his men to stay in their defensive positions and force the Americans to expose themselves to danger in trying to pry them out of their holes and earthworks one by one. Marine General Holland Smith noticed this and paid his enemy a typically Marine style of compliment saying of General Kuribayashi, “I don’t know who he is, but the Japanese General running this show is one smart bastard.” The Japanese resisted fiercely and took a heavy toll on the attacking Marines as the fight for Iwo Jima dragged on for days and weeks. General Kuribayashi was among the last still holding out.
Knowing that the end was near, he wrote,

“The battle is entering its final chapter. Since the enemy's landing, the gallant fighting of the men under my command has been such that even the gods would weep. In particular, I humbly rejoice in the fact that they have continued to fight bravely though utterly empty-handed and ill-equipped against a land, sea, and air attack of a material superiority such as surpasses the imagination. One after another they are falling in the ceaseless and ferocious attacks of the enemy. For this reason, the situation has arisen whereby I must disappoint your expectations and yield this important place to the hands of the enemy. With humility and sincerity, I offer my repeated apologies. Our ammunition is gone and our water dried up. Now is the time for us to make the final counterattack and fight gallantly, conscious of the Emperor's favor, not begrudging our efforts though they turn our bones to powder and pulverize our bodies. I believe that until the island is recaptured, the Emperor's domain will be eternally insecure. I therefore swear that even when I have become a ghost I shall look forward to turning the defeat of the Imperial Army to victory. I stand now at the beginning of the end. At the same time as revealing my inmost feelings, I pray earnestly for the unfailing victory and security of the Empire. Farewell for all eternity.”

General Tadamichi Kuribayashi died on or around March 26, 1945. As there were virtually no survivors, the exact nature of his death has been subject to some speculation. Some accounts say he was killed in action during an attack on an enemy camp, others say he committed seppuku near his headquarters after facing north and bowing three times toward the Imperial Palace after which his assistants shot themselves after burying him. Whatever the exact circumstances were, General Kuribayashi had died like a hero and more than fulfilled his duty to resist and defend Iwo Jima to the very end. He had taken a heavy toll on the U.S. Marines and Iwo Jima was the only battle in which total American casualties were greater than total Japanese casualties. He had also earned the respect of his enemies, Marine General Holland Smith wanted to give Kuribayashi a proper burial with military honors but his body could not be found. In his memoirs, General Holland wrote, “Of all our adversaries in the Pacific, Kuribayashi was the most redoubtable.” And, while public support for the war certainly did not fall off because of the battle, the staunch resistance of Kuribayashi did have an impact as many in the United States later questioned suffering such heavy losses to capture an island that was not very strategically significant. General Kuribayashi had been tasked with fighting a hopeless battle but he fought that battle with the greatest skill and heroism possible, accomplishing as much as could have been accomplished in such a situation. He stands as a figure worthy of the utmost respect and admiration.

Submarine Hero Kinashi Takakazu 木梨 鷹一

Human beings are very fond of ‘keeping score’. This is as true in warfare as it is in sports or other civilian activities. We rank tank commanders by how many enemy tanks they destroy, fighter pilots by how many planes they shoot down or, with submarine commanders, how much tonnage of enemy shipping they sent to the bottom of the sea. Lieutenant Commander Kinashi Takakazu (or in western order; Takakazu Kinashi) was a submarine captain of the Imperial Japanese Navy, yet, his name will not be found in any top ranking of “ace” submarine commanders based on the amount of tonnage he sank. However, sometimes a submarine commander gains fame for accomplishing a particularly difficult or dangerous goal, for sinking some major enemy warship or something which, in some way, gains attention for breaking some sort of record. This is the category that Commander Kinashi fits into. In fact, he never really knew just how incredible was the success he won in his military career. Nonetheless, he earned a place in naval history and a legendary status among the ranks of the submariners of the world for his achievement. It is unfortunate that he never knew just how famous he would become.

Kinashi Takakazu was born on March 7, 1902 in Usuki, Oita Prefecture on the southern island of Kyushu in the Empire of Japan. After a fairly typical childhood, he decided on a career in the navy as a young man. Looking only at the start of his military career, no one would have expected him to rise to greatness. He studied and trained at the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy and graduated at the very bottom of his class, the very last of 255 cadets in 1920. After this less than impressive academic performance, his career path had nothing to do with submarines as he served as a passed midshipman on several cruisers on training exercises. From 1924 to 1925 he traveled around the Pacific stopping in at such places as Acapulco, Mexico, San Francisco, California, Vancouver, British Columbia and Hawaii. He received his promotion to ensign before returning to Japan where he underwent training in torpedoes and naval artillery. He was a dedicated and dutiful young officer but still did not seem to be at all exceptional. In 1926 he was promoted to lieutenant and assigned to the destroyer Harukaze. It was only after that assignment that he began to think about submarine service.

The following year, Kinashi volunteered for sub duty and gained important experience serving on the I-54, I-61 and I-66. It was certainly something different but he still did not stand out all that much and returned to the surface fleet to serve on a river gunboat in China (at the time, various foreign powers maintained naval vessels on the major rivers in China). He also served on the destroyer Fubuki and by December of 1937 had been promoted to lieutenant commander and posted to the minelayer Okinoshima, hardly a prestigious assignment. For any young naval officer of the time, serving on a battleship was always the most sought-after posting and, perhaps discouraged by his position in the surface fleet, Kinashi transferred back to the submarines. In 1938 he was finally given command of his own boat, becoming captain of the RO-59. The RO-type boats were smaller, second class coastal submarines that were largely neglected by the naval high command but, at least, it was a place to start. In 1940 Commander Kinashi was transferred to the Submarine Warfare School but this proved only temporary as six month later he was back at sea as captain of the I-3 until November of 1940 when he was given command of the RO-34 on which he served until July of 1941. The I-3 was one of the earliest ‘cruiser’ type submarines, a J1-type, which was later converted into a transport. The RO-34 was one of the first medium subs (a K5-type) since the 1920’s and would see service later in the war but with no success.

When Japan went to war with the United States (and others) in December of 1941, Kinashi was captain of the I-62 (later I-162), a small KD4-type sub that had some success in the Dutch East Indies and the Indian Ocean. However, Kinashi was soon transferred to command the I-19 where he would gain his greatest fame. This came during the titanic struggle for the island of Guadalcanal, perhaps the most pivotal land engagement of the Pacific War and coming on the heels of the stunning defeat for Japan at the Battle of Midway which had decimated the Imperial Navy. The fight for Guadalcanal was to be a turning point and Japan threw everything possible into defending the island which they had invaded in early 1942 (it was part of the British Solomon Islands protectorate).

I-19

The I-19 was a B1-type sub, one of the most successful types Japan would produce. In keeping with standard Japanese tactics, the I-19 and her sister sub I-15 were deployed to interdict American vessels approaching the island. Such vessels were coming as part of “Operation Shoestring” but the American forces had already suffered considerable losses for the greatest prize in the U.S. Navy: the aircraft carriers. In the Battle of the Eastern Solomons the USS Enterprise had been so badly damaged that it had to return to Hawaii for repairs and only a week later the Japanese submarine I-26 badly damaged the USS Saratoga (Admiral Fletcher’s flagship) which left only the USS Wasp and USS Hornet. These were the targets that Commander Kinashi and his counterpart on the I-15 wanted most of all. Kinashi in the I-19 would go after the WASP while the I-15 tried to engage the Hornet. It was September 15, 1942, a clear day with sunny skies and a 20-knot trade wind blowing. Kinashi submerged his boat and moved in for the attack. Displaying immense calm and skill, he took the I-19 through the rings of deadly destroyers escorting the American carrier. As these were the only two left, their escorts were all the more determined to defend them. Running as silently as possible, Kinashi slipped underneath the floating guard dogs and, amazingly, remained undetected.

Once well clear, Kinashi ordered his diving officer to bring the boat up to periscope depth. Scanning the surface, he spotted the USS Wasp, displacing 14,900 tons and capable of holding up to a hundred aircraft, she was a formidable target. The ship was part of a task force escorting the 7th Division of the U.S. Marine Corps to Guadalcanal which, along with the Hornet, included the battleship USS North Carolina and ten other warships. Kinashi knew the odds were against him. He would get only one chance to fire and would then, most likely, be destroyed by the counter-attacking American warships. Still, he had made it through the escorts and hoped that his good fortune would hold. He ordered the maximum salvo possible, all six forward torpedo tubes were made ready in all respects. As he watched through the periscope, passing along the necessary information, another bit of good fortune came his way; the Wasp began to slow down to launch 26 planes and allow another 11 to land that were coming back from patrol. It was the perfect time. Kinashi was determined that he would hit his target and moved his boat in closer and closer, even though this increased the risk of someone spotting his periscope and spoiling his attack but he did not want to miss. It took nerves of steel but Commander Kinashi and the I-19 silently swam to within 500 meters of the massive American ship. He wasn’t spotted and things could not have worked out better if he had been giving orders to the helmsman of the WASP himself. To launch the planes, the carrier began to turn to starboard, presenting its beam (and thus the largest possible target) to the Japanese sub.

USS Wasp CV-7

Finally, with the tension onboard at maximum, Kinashi gave the order to fire. Six deadly Type 95 burst from the bow and shot through the water. The Type 95’s were the fastest torpedoes in the world and at only 500 meters, the Wasp barely had time to react to the sudden attack. Lookouts spotted the incoming torpedoes and Captain Forrest Sherman tried to turn his ship toward but it was too late. In quick succession, three torpedoes slammed into the Wasp, one even shooting out of the water to strike above the waterline. Massive explosions went off and began to spread and almost immediately the huge ship began listing heavily to starboard. The torpedoes had hit exactly where the gasoline tanks and magazines were on the carrier. Within about 30 minutes Captain Sherman gave the order to abandon ship. The Wasp was finished.

Of course, as soon as Commander Kinashi fired his torpedoes, he slammed the periscope down and took his boat deep, knowing that a counter-attack by the circling destroyers was soon to come. The U.S. Navy did not disappoint as destroyers circled over head, groping the depths with sonar and lobbing depth charges at the unseen attacker. It was the I-15 which confirmed the sinking of the Wasp since Kinashi was deep below the surface trying to save his boat and his crew from being blasted into little pieces. The attack of the I-15 on Hornet, five miles away, had not been successful. For Kinashi and the I-19, they endured the worst experience possible for submariners as the American destroyers dropped no less than eighty depth charges in the frantic effort to destroy them. Yet, Kinashi and his men did not panic and amazingly managed to survive the ordeal and successfully escape from the American fleet. Once clear, Kinashi surfaced his boat and as the men came out, gasping for fresh air, they knew they were heroes. They had done what very few men in naval history had ever accomplished: sank an American aircraft carrier. They had even lived to tell the tale.

Kinashi and his men returned to Japan for a hero’s welcome. Kinashi, who had finished last in his class and whose career had always seemed rather lackluster, was promoted to full commander and summoned to the Imperial Palace to report on the sinking and receive the congratulations of His Majesty the Emperor. For a Japanese naval officer, there was no greater honor possible. Kinashi was formal and correct, he had done his duty as he had been trained to. In fact, being brought before the Emperor was probably a source of greater anxiety than facing a fleet of American warships had been. In terms of his naval career, Kinashi had reached his pinnacle and would not see such success again. The following year, near Fiji, he torpedoed and badly damaged an American liberty ship but inexplicably failed to finish it off. However, in December of 1943 he was tasked with a most dangerous mission. In command of the I-29 he would travel through three oceans to pay a visit to Japan’s Nazi allies in Europe. At the former British bastion of Singapore the I-29 was filled with rubber, tin, tungsten, opium and other items before sailing off for France. Thanks to their code-breakers, the Allies knew all about the voyage of the I-29 and where it was going, yet, Commander Kinashi skillfully avoided discovery.

Kinashi at a banquet given by the Germans

On March 11, 1944 the I-29 safely arrived at the port of Lorient, France where her cargo was unloaded and the crew were treated as the special guests of the Germans. Commander Kinashi was taken to Berlin to be congratulated by Adolf Hitler for sinking an American carrier, for which the Nazi dictator personally decorated Kinashi with the Iron Cross (second class). In April, filled to the top with important passengers and the latest German designs for everything from radar to rocket engines, the I-29 left France for the return trip to Japan. Unfortunately, none of the men on the I-29 would ever see their homeland again. American intelligence was tracking the Japanese submarine more closely this time and as the boat passed through the Luzon Strait near the Philippines on July 26, 1944 was hit by three torpedoes and totally destroyed by the American submarine USS Sawfish. Commander Kinashi and all his men and passengers were killed. When the naval high command in Japan realized that the I-29 had been lost, Commander Kinashi was posthumously promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral in recognition of his outstanding service.

And yet, that service was more outstanding than anyone knew. On that critical day in 1942, I-19 had fired six torpedoes at what, in naval terms, was practically point blank range and yet only three had struck the WASP. What of the other three? It would be some time before the truth was known. On that same day, the accompanying battleship USS North Carolina had been struck by a torpedo on her port side, killing five men and causing considerable damage (only the quick and expert work of the damage control teams prevented the ship from sinking). The destroyer USS O’Brien was also hit on the port side by a torpedo and was so badly damaged that she later sunk. For years it was assumed that the I-15, targeting the Hornet, had hit these ships with the torpedoes she had fired at the carrier with but missed. Eventually, however, careful study showed that this was not possible, they could not have come from the I-15. Suddenly, the naval experts realized what an incredible thing had happened. When Kinashi fired his salvo at the WASP, three torpedoes struck and sank the carrier but the other three continued on, over the horizon, running for some twelve miles before slamming in the North Carolina and then the O’Brien. Everyone then realized that Commander Kinashi Takakazu had made the single more successfully destructive attack in naval history. With one salvo of torpedoes he had sunk an aircraft carrier, a destroyer and heavily damaged a battleship even if he did not know it at the time.

It is for that reason that the name of Rear Admiral Kinashi Takakazu is still a legend in the submarine community today and why he will always have a place in naval history. No one shot ever did so much damage to the enemy as the one he fired from beneath the waves on that sunny day in 1942 off Guadalcanal. Kinashi may not have the highest score among submarine commanders but he accomplished something that no one else ever did or is ever likely to and for that he holds a very singular place of honor.

Japanese Military Innovations in World War II

When it comes to military innovation, during and leading up to World War II the Empire of Japan was absolutely on the cutting edge. In terms of weapons for the army, there was not much that was very remarkable from Japan which tended to lag behind the other major powers in tanks and heavy weapons that were the latest trends in military technology. However, it made up for that by surpassing all others in terms of air and naval warfare innovations, possessing the best naval aircraft and the best torpedo at the start of the war by all accounts. Still, for the Imperial Japanese Army, while weaponry may have been lacking, innovation in strategy and skilled leadership was certainly not. One need only consider the fact that such major world powers as the United States and the British Empire both suffered their worst military defeats at the hands of Japan in the early days of the war. When it came to the latest in military weaponry, tanks, aircraft, naval aviation and submarine technology, Japan certainly had the most difficulty when it came to tanks. In border clashes with the Russians in Mongolia, the Japanese suffered severe setbacks even though, especially at that time, the Russians themselves were far from being up to the standard of other powers in terms of tanks. Japan was hampered in this regard by never fighting an enemy in which armored combat was really essential. The Chinese never fielded much of a challenge in that regard and the attacks on Southeast Asia were made against colonial powers that were already engaged in a fight for survival in Europe and they had no tanks to defend these colonies and most had only token military forces designed to maintain law and order rather than repel a determined invader. Still, in some of the island battles it became clear that some answer had to be made to the rugged and reliable American M4 Sherman and by the end of the war Japan did develop some tank types that would have posed a challenge, such as the Type 3 Chi-nu. However, it was produced so late in the war that it was reserved to defend the home islands against an invasion that never came so that none were tested in battle.

On the sea and in the air, however, things were very different. The Japanese were absolutely on the cutting edge of developing military aircraft. The famous Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter, mostly used in naval aviation but which was ground-based as well, was regarded by both Axis and Allied countries as the best carrier-based fighter in the world at the time. In the early weeks and months of the war, the Japanese Zero shot down 12 Allied planes for every one of their own lost. It gave Japan a marked advantage over anything the British or Americans had on hand to use against it. The only problem was that, once the war began, it became extremely difficult for Japanese industry to keep up as American fighters continued to improve. However, the biggest loss was in pilots. The most successful fighter pilots of the war, after the Germans, were the Japanese, the most successful being Lieutenant Hiroyoshi Nishizawa who, even by the most conservative of statistics, shot down far more planes than the best British, Russian or American pilots. An expert Japanese pilot in the latest aircraft proved to be capable of victory even against enemy forces that were considerably superior in number. The problem was that so many of these expert, remarkably well trained pilots were lost at the disastrous Battle of Midway that Japanese naval aviation was never able to recover. Pilots simply could not be trained and new planes designed and manufactured fast enough to keep up with what the war effort demanded.

Yokosuka "Ohka" rocket plane

However, it was the Japanese who proved the real value of naval aviation and the centrality of the aircraft carrier in modern warfare. As mentioned, they took a lesson from the British raid on Taranto, but not many others did. Too many military leaders around the world regarded Taranto as a fluke, a case of the British being lucky and later felt satisfied when it was shown that the damage to the Italian fleet had not been quite as extensive as was first thought. However, after the overwhelming, stunning, Japanese victory at Pearl Harbor (the worst defeat in the history of the United States Navy) no one could ignore the results. The innovative military thinking of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto had been vindicated dramatically. Japan also developed, during the war, the Kawanishi N1K “Strong Wind” interceptor that proved more than a match for the American “Corsair” or “Mustang” and at least a match for the famous F6F “Hellcat”. However, it was impossible to produce these in sufficient numbers for them to have much of an impact. Production quality was also a problem for the Nakajima Ki-84 “Gale” fighter but when it was properly built, had good quality fuel and an expert pilot it was an extremely effective aircraft and was capable of such high speed (nearly 400mph) that it was able to intercept the B-29 Superfortress bombers. Using technical data supplied by Germany, Japan also had several designs for jet aircraft by the end of the war but they were too late to see service. Now, even if one were to discount these craft because none were completed and they were based on German technology, Japan developed craft independent that were very similar. Probably the most famous was the Yokosuka MXY7 “Cherry Blossom” (Ohka) which was a rocket-propelled suicide plane. Its speed was so great that it was virtually unstoppable in its final attack and forced the US Navy to re-organize their anti-aircraft defenses. They did not have much of an impact, as a suicide-weapon it was a weapon of desperation but showed how far “outside the box” Japanese military designers were able to go.

The one area where Japanese innovation stood out more than any other, and so much so that it really requires very little in the way of explanation, was in naval warships and submarines. Already pioneers in the utilization of aircraft carriers, the Imperial Japanese Navy pushed the boundaries of military technology for both traditional warships and in new fields such as the submarine fleet. The problem was that most of these never had the chance to really engage in the sort of battle for which they were intended. Nonetheless, the designs were positively astounding and some have never been surpassed even to this day. Undoubtedly the most famous Japanese naval vessel of the war was the battleship Yamato, though its sister ship, Musashi, was probably even more formidable. These were, quite simply, the largest battleships ever built and will probably always remain so. They were built as part of the thinking of the Japanese naval high command which was focused on a major, decisive, battle such as was won by Admiral Togo at Tsushima in the war against Russia. With these two monster warships, Japan was confident of being able to totally dominate any ship-to-ship engagement with any navy in the world.

super-battleship Yamato

The problem, of course, was that such a battle never came about, partly because of Japan’s own victory at Pearl Harbor which largely decimated the American battleship force. The US struck back with aircraft carriers and submarines and the two huge battleships remained in port, protected from such threats, for most of the war. However, they did finally come out to do battle, when the odds were irreversibly stacked against Japan, at Leyte Gulf. Coming under attack from the air, as opposed to from enemy surface ships which she was intended to combat, the Musashi was finally sunk but only after enduring an unbelievable 17 direct bomb hits and (believe it or not) 19 torpedo hits at the Battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944. The Yamato went out in 1945 on a suicide mission against US forces at Okinawa and was likewise sunk by American carrier planes but likewise it took no less than 7 direct bomb hits and being struck by 10 torpedoes before the massive ship went down. There was a third such ship planned but during construction it was decided to turn it into an aircraft carrier rather than a battleship and the result was the Shinano, the largest aircraft carrier in the world and the largest warship of any kind ever built up to that time. Unfortunately for Japan, it was sunk by an American submarine before it ever launched a single aircraft in combat, which at least goes to show that the cautious attitude towards the Yamato and Musashi had been justified.

Japan also broke plenty of records under the water as well. No one was as innovative as Japan when it came to submarine design, though Japanese boats were so poorly utilized that they never came close to scoring anywhere near the success that Germany or Italy did. This was partly due to an over-ambitious strategy combined with overly-cautious tactics (which meant few ever got the opportunity to score many victories) but also because of the level of innovation itself which resulted in Japan producing so many different types of subs that none were able to be mass-produced in the numbers needed to have any appreciable impact on the war effort. Nonetheless, Japan produced highly advanced boats that demonstrated immense creativity and technical know-how. One area Japan was famous for was in combining air power with submarines. Many Japanese subs were equipped with small scout planes that could be launched and recovered from the sub itself to serve as reconnaissance aircraft. One even took up a few incendiary bombs which were dropped on the west coast of the United States. However, as the war situation became more desperate, many subs were forced into carrying cargo to isolated, starving garrisons on the islands of the south Pacific.

super-submarine I-400

It is all the more remarkable though, given how Japanese subs were never used to their full potential, that some still did manage to pull off incredible successes. For example, in the Battle of Midway, Lt. Comm. Yahachi Tanabe of the I-168 daringly steered under a screen of US destroyers to sink the aircraft carrier USS Yorktown and the destroyer USS Hammann. Even more incredibly, Tanebe and his crew then managed to survive the ensuing counter-attack and evade the US warships to return damaged but intact to Japan. Most famous of all was Lt. Comm. Takakazu Kinashi of the I-19 who, on September 15, 1943, scored the single most successful submarine attack in history when one salvo of torpedoes took down the aircraft carrier USS Wasp, damaged the battleship USS North Carolina and sank the destroyer USS O’Brien. In terms of boat designs, Japan produced the super-streamlined SenTaka class boats which actually had a higher underwater speed than even the most advanced late-war German Type XXI, making them the fastest submarines up to that time and which were also extremely deep-diving. However, they came too late to see action. Similarly, Japan produced the very famous SenToku class boats, I-400, I-401 and I-402 which were massive ‘double-decker’ submarines equipped with three Seiran bombers. Originally intended to be used for surprise bombing raids against Washington and New York they were later planned for an attack on the Panama Canal but the war ended before they reached their target. These had a longer-range than any submarine in history, giving them more endurance than any sub before the nuclear era and they were the largest submarines ever built up until the launch of the American nuclear ballistic missile submarine USS Benjamin Franklin in 1965. In fact, some of the early American missile subs were probably based off of the I-400 design.

Could World War II in Asia Have Been Avoided?

The European theater of World War II seems positively simplistic when compared to the conflict in the Pacific and East Asia. In Europe, the essential reason for the start of hostilities was straightforward; Britain and France had given a war guarantee to Poland, Germany invaded Poland and so Britain and France declared war and “The Great War, Take Two” was underway. However, in Asia, the war had much more complicated origins. The start was simple enough; the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, followed up in quick order by attacks on British, American and Dutch forces or territory throughout Southeast Asia. Thus, whereas even Hitler could claim that he had wanted no trouble with Britain and France but was obliged to go to war as they had attacked him over German actions which did not threaten them in the least (and while not declaring war on the Soviet Union which invaded Poland as well), Japan can not escape being the aggressor. The Allies, at least starting with America, Britain and Holland, had every justification for going to war since, after all, it was the Empire of Japan which had attacked them. And yet, while the war in Europe started abruptly, the war in Asia was merely the expansion of hostilities that had been underway for the better part of a decade. The Empire of Japan was already at war in December of 1941, their attacks simply widened that war to add Britain, America, the Netherlands and eventually many more along with China to their list of enemies.

In Europe, there had been a clear escalation as Nazi Germany expanded. The Rhineland, Austria, the Sudetenland, Hitler had moved to reclaim German-populated areas step by step and the Allies grumbled and grumbled more until finally the line was drawn at Poland. Hitler crossed that line and the war was on. Yet, in Asia, no one seemed to want to draw a line. Where would it be drawn? Japan had occupied Manchuria and while the Allies grumbled, no one was prepared to do anything about it. Chinese and Japanese forces clashed in China, and yet no one did anything about it. Such a thing was rather hard to complain about honestly. Japan had not exactly invaded China in the way Germany invaded Poland, the Japanese troops were already there as were the military forces of many other countries, including Britain and America. Then Japan occupied French Indochina and the Allies became more seriously alarmed, enough to put sanctions on Japan in an effort to coerce the Japanese into doing what they thought best. Yet, while Japan was prepared to use force if necessary, the occupation had been done with the consent of the French government at Vichy, a government which, at the time, was still recognized by the United States as the legal government of France. So, there was the rather bizarre situation of countries which Japan had not molested in any way, placing sanctions on Japan for occupying a French colony with the consent of the French government.

When war did break out, while Japan was certainly the aggressor, no one can honestly say that they became so completely out of the blue. For American President Roosevelt to call the attack on Pearl Harbor “unprovoked”, as he did, was totally untrue. The United States, followed by Great Britain and the Netherlands, did plenty to provoke Japan to action. For the British and Dutch, joining in the American sanctions on Japan was practically a necessity as they desperately needed American goodwill and American support in their war against Germany with the Germans having conquered and occupied the Netherlands and the Germans bombing Britain relentlessly while maintaining a tightening counter-blockade against Britain with their submarine fleet. Where we begin to see how avoidable or unavoidable the war in Asia was is in the response of the Roosevelt administration to two regimes they did not like, Germany and Japan, but lacked the support of the American people in actively going to war against. The United States was neutral from 1939 to December 8, 1941 but the USA was far from impartial. In fact, American “neutrality” approached the level of farce.

In Europe, all American business was with Great Britain rather than Germany and likewise, to a much lesser extent, with China rather than Japan. Roosevelt had a family history and personal ties that prejudiced him to favor the Chinese and while he was no great fan of Britain, there had long been a very powerful Anglophile clique in the American government. After the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Roosevelt became even more determined to do all he could short of war to defeat Germany and Italy. His focus really was more on Europe than Asia while the American public wanted no war with either. His actions made it seem that war with Germany would be the least avoidable. Abandoning neutrality in all but name practically, American warships were actually attacking German warships in the Atlantic on orders from Roosevelt while still claiming America to be neutral. However, Hitler, quite wisely, decided to endure this provocation because the damage incurred on his submarines was miniscule compared to the almost certain defeat he would face if he retaliated and brought the United States into World War II, particularly before Russia was conquered and Britain was still defiant. Thus, oddly enough, FDR’s more overt provocations against Germany did not result in war but his non-violent provocation against Japan did.

After the Japanese occupied French Indochina (Laos, Cambodia & Vietnam) the United States froze all Japanese assets, banned Japanese shipping from the Panama Canal and put an embargo on vital resources to Japan. America was Japan’s primary source of these materials and when America persuaded Britain and Holland (ruler of the Dutch East Indies -now Indonesia) to do the same, it backed Japan into a corner. From that moment, Japan was fighting against time, growing weaker every day and so was forced to either give in to American demands or go to war while they still had the strength to do so. The radical militarists were, of course, in favor of war and (rightly) wanted it to come as soon as possible. However, most leaders in Tokyo were intelligent enough to realize that a war with America would be as near to totally impossible to win as one could get. So, there were feverish negotiations to try to restore friendly relations with the United States but those Japanese pushing for peace were met with two formidable obstacles; the radicals of their own country whose pride was such that they fought backing down on anything and the person of U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull who displayed a consistently bigoted attitude toward the Japanese and who was perfectly happy to delay any resolution as long as possible while American forces grew stronger and Japan grew weaker.

What makes the whole situation ultimately frustrating was that a clock was ticking away toward the start of a war that the vast majority in both countries did not want to fight, two countries who had no territorial disputes and no conflicting interests of national security. It is horrifically tragic that there were numerous avenues and opportunities to have prevented the outbreak of hostilities which were squandered. Some were realistic and some were not. The Japanese got behind a peace effort made by two intrepid Catholic priests who had missionary experience in China and were convinced that the communists would eventually threaten all of East Asia. They put forward a plan for the USA to effectively just back down and leave Japan alone so that the Japanese could establish a sort of Japanese version of the Monroe Doctrine for East Asia as Japan was the only regional power capable of dealing with the communist threat. Such a notion would never get beyond someone like Hull, nevertheless, the talks did produce a real chance for peace if both sides had been more amenable and ultimately if the United States had simply been more clear.

The Roosevelt administration wanted the Japanese out of Indochina and out of China plain and simple. Obviously, Japan could have simply abandoned their undeclared war in China, withdrawn to their own territory and would likely still be the top regional power of East Asia to this day. The militarists would never let that happen but there was still an avenue to peace as most Japanese leaders did not really want to be fighting the Chinese nationalists anyway. They had been drawn into the conflict since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and were too proud to back down afterwards. They already had a dominant position to begin with and there was nothing that Japan really wanted or needed from Chiang Kai-shek other than peace. The problem was that the militarists stubbornly insisted that the Chinese be the ones to back down and come to them for peace rather than the reverse. The undeclared war was a quagmire for Japan. Victory after victory had been won and yet, nearly a decade after it began, Japan was no closer to success, again, partly because Japan had no goal in mind other than Chiang Kai-shek suing for peace. Such a peace should have been possible, especially after the sanctions on Japan made Tokyo more desperate for some way out of their perilous situation. Things were so serious and the prospects of war were so gloomy that, ultimately, Japanese leaders did agree to the idea of the United States being called upon to negotiate an end to the hostilities in China.

What an opportunity this represented! Today, not many people may be aware just how agreeable the Japanese had, eventually, become to American demands. In the course of their negotiations the Japanese finally agreed to a timetable for the evacuation of their forces from Indochina as well as from China once hostilities were concluded. There was a provision, which should not have been much of an impediment, for Japan to retain a sufficient token force in the north to deal with any communist threat but, on the whole, Japan was prepared to agree to American demands provided the undeclared war with China could have been ended and there was even support in Tokyo for America to broker such a peace. It was a golden opportunity which China would scarcely have had reason to object to and which would have allowed both sides to save face by avoiding having to approach their opposite directly to ask for peace. Such an agreement would have lifted the sanctions against Japan, ended the war in China and still have seen Japan retain her dominant position in northeast Asia. The problem was that this idea came too late with Japan never firmly committing itself and with the USA, particularly Hull, being unwilling to believe Japan was sincere. Yet, it was a possibility, it could have happened.

There was only one real impediment to this “on the ground” as it were and that was the “Reorganized National Government” of the Republic of China led by Wang Jingwei. This was the regime established in 1940 under the sponsorship of Japan and which was quickly recognized by the Empire of Japan as the “legitimate” government of China after they decided that it was hopeless trying to deal with Chiang Kai-shek. This was a major political blunder on the part of Japan as it made it all but impossible to ever come to a negotiated peace with Chiang Kai-shek who, naturally, was not about to ever give such a regime any recognition at all. However, once it was done and Japan had recognized it, the Japanese did not want to back down and disavow it. Subsequent peace talks then involved Japan demanding that a prerequisite of peace with Chiang Kai-shek was his accepting some sort of power-sharing government with Wang Jingwei which he would never agree to as Wang Jingwei had immediately assumed a status equivalent to Benedict Arnold in the United States or Vidkun Quisling in Norway, in other words, the perfect traitor. If Japan had been prepared to abandon Wang Jingwei, an untrustworthy fellow in any event, it would have made peace much more possible.

Finally, and perhaps most tragically, much of the growing tensions between the United States and Japan in the negotiations to avoid the outbreak of war might have been avoided but for a simple misunderstanding. The final word which caused Japan to give up trying to come to terms with the United States was the note given by Hull to the Japanese ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu on November 26, 1941. It demanded that Japan withdraw all military forces from China and Indochina, support no other regime in China save Chiang Kai-shek (in other words, tossing out Wang Jingwei) and to dissolve the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in exchange for which the United States would lift the sanctions, unfreeze Japanese assets, grant a new trade agreement and “Most Favored Nation” trading status with Japan, stabilize the dollar-yen rate as well as other economic concessions. It was the most blunt and harsh proposal America had made to Japan and both Nomura and Kurusu knew as soon as they read it that it would be ’dead on arrival’ in Tokyo. Yet, even that, might not have been the last word but for a misunderstanding.

All the Japanese who read the note assumed that by ordering all Japanese forces to withdraw from “China” that Hull was referring to Manchuria as well which would have left the Empire of Manchukuo easy prey for Chiang Kai-shek. It was a natural assumption given that the United States had objected to the restoration of the Manchurian monarchy and had never recognized the client empire. It was the one point that infuriated the Japanese the most. The tragic thing is that even Hull had never intended to go that far, he never intended “China” to include Manchuria which he had earlier implied at the very least was not a major concern to the United States. Only many years after the war did the associates of General Hideki Tojo (Prime Minister of Japan in 1941) learn of this. One said that if they had known that the United States would have recognized Manchukuo that the Hull proposal would have been accepted. The others would not go that far but agreed that it would have made a significant difference, perhaps leading to a different proposal that would have been agreed to or brought about a change in government that would have prevented the attack on Pearl Harbor and thus the outbreak of hostilities. If the United States had been clear on this point, the war as it happened could well have been avoided.

The bottom line is that the war in Asia did not have to happen and were it not for needless mistrust, arrogant pride and simple misunderstanding it could have easily been prevented. Japan clearly made the decision to initiate hostilities but both sides were guilty of helping bring it about. The United States was intervening in things that did not concern American vital interests and was holding Japan to a standard it did not hold other countries to. American officials, particularly Hull, treated the Japanese contemptuously, reacting angrily when Japan was disagreeable and then doubting their sincerity when Japan was agreeable. That U.S. policy ‘boxed in’ Japan and forced the Japanese to choose between war or humiliation is undeniable. Yet, it is also undeniable that the Japanese made taking them at their word difficult as they lacked a coherent policy and a single voice in foreign affairs with so many different factions pursuing different agendas at the same time. Likewise, faced with the prospect of a hopeless war and total ruin, the Japanese militarists could have, at any time, swallowed their pride and withdrawn from an undeclared war in China many did not want to be fighting anyway and could have restored good relations while retaining for the Empire of Japan their mastery of Manchuria, Korea, Taiwan, south Sakhalin, all of the Kuriles and the South Pacific mandate. The war could have been avoided and should have been as it brought nothing but misery and left ruin in its wake for almost everyone involved.

Whether the different courses of action detailed above would have prevented further warfare entirely is a debatable point. All depended on the actions of Japan and it was almost impossible for Japan to have a clear foreign policy given that the military could bring down any government by withholding their support and the military was divided into numerous factions, each advocating a different vision for the empire. The navy, for example, tended to favor the “strike south” policy which would have inevitably led to world war (as happened) as it called for expansion into Southeast Asia and the conquest of British, French & Dutch colonies by Japan. The army tended to favor the “strike north” policy of focusing on the threat of Soviet Russia and looked to expand control or at least dominant influence over Mongolia and parts of Siberia. If this policy had been chosen, while the Allied democracies may have grumbled, it is hard to imagine any of them taking action in defense of Stalin and the Soviet Union.

One major benefit to the “strike north” policy, however, was that it was a long-term strategy. Advocates of this policy wanted to finish up the war in China, consolidate in Manchuria, build up the industrial and economic strength of Japan and then go to war with Russia when there was a more realistic chance of success. However, the army itself was divided between various factions such as the “Control Faction” and the “Imperial Way Faction”. The more conservative “Control Faction” looked to the cautious, slow, long-term strengthening of Japan whereas the more radical “Imperial Way Faction” wanted effectively a military dictatorship and a more aggressive policy towards Russia. However, the “Imperial Way Faction” met with a series of setbacks, the first being the February 26 Incident, practically an attempted coup, which was defeated and saw a considerable backlash against the “Imperial Way” in 1936. Then, in 1939, the Japanese Sixth Army was defeated by the Russians in the Nomonhan Incident on the Manchu-Mongol border, the same year the Nazi-Soviet Pact went into effect and a nervous Japan quickly agreed to its own non-aggression pact with Stalin. This left the “strike south faction” in a dominant position and that was a course that would inevitably lead to war with the US, France, Holland and the British Empire. Obviously, one may note that all of these discussions and plans were going on long before America and Britain placed any sanctions or other pressure at all on Japan.

Because of all of this, we can see that some sort of conflict would have been harder to avoid than the actual war that did break out at the end of 1941. The conflict that happened then was clearly avoidable and had the United States been more clear and even-handed, it could have been. If the militarists in Japan had put the long-term interests of their country ahead of their own pride, that certainly would have helped too. However, the prospect of some future clash of arms would have been more difficult to avoid and that due almost entirely to the aggressive and anti-western sentiment in Japan that fueled antagonism with the other major powers as did Japanese adherence to the Tripartite Pact with Hitler and Mussolini. There was a slogan, then widespread in Japan, that could be translated as “don’t miss the bus”, meaning the opportunity for military expansion caused by the fact that all of the focus of the great powers was on Nazi Germany and Hitler’s conquests in Europe. In light of subsequent events, everyone should be able to agree that Japan and the rest of the countries involved in the war in East Asia would have been much the better off if that bus had been allowed to speed on down the road.

So, we can see that there were multiple occasions on which the war, as it happened, could have and should have been easily avoided. If communications between Tokyo and the Japanese forces in China had been faster, it might have been avoided. If the Chinese had not escalated the conflict, if the United States had simply minded its own business and likewise if the United States had been truly impartial in the Sino-Japanese conflict, it might have been avoided. Failing that, if the Japanese military had been willing to swallow its pride and withdraw from a war in China that nobody wanted and served only the interests of the communists, it might have been avoided and Japan would have still been master of an extensive empire. It is all the more tragic that it wasn’t avoided because the war in China served no real interest of Japan since the communists were hanging back and letting the nationalists do the fighting and because Japanese actions in northeast China and Manchuria did not impact the vital national interests of America, Britain, France or any other western country. Nor was the Tripartite Pact ultimately very helpful to either Japan on one side or Germany and Italy on the other considering that Japan did not join the war against Soviet Russia, no significant aid or assistance was able to pass between the two sides and considering that the Allies were able to overpower all of them more or less at the same time. The fact that it wasn’t avoided ultimately served only the interests of the communists who emerged larger, stronger and more threatening as a result of the whole sad affair.

After Pearl Harbor, Lessons Learned

It was on this day in 1941 that United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Democrat) went addressed Congress about the attack on Pearl Harbor and requested and received a vote declaring war on the Empire of Japan. As I have pointed out before (here) Roosevelt was very misleading with the American public to say the least of it when it came to Pearl Harbor and (as discussed here) it was not true that the Empire of Japan wanted a war against the United States. The reason for that is simple enough as was proven by subsequent events; it was a war that all the military experts in Japan knew they stood very little chance of being able to win. The United States simply had Japan outmatched in terms of numbers, economic output, resources and industrial capacity. That fact itself was the main motivating factor behind the necessity for having the element of surprise in the attack on Pearl Harbor. Japan's only hope was to strike a crippling blow at the outset in order to stand any chance of winning or rather coming to a negotiated peace favorable to Japan in the long-term of the war. In the end, it didn't work out and many thousands of Americans lost their lives and Japan suffered immensely because of the conflict that never should have happened.

Despite what many people (in both countries actually) believe, Japan did not want to fight a war with the United States. It was something Japan was practically forced into, the Japanese government was backed into a corner and war was seen as the only way out. That really should not even be up for debate. However, what may surprise many people is that Japan did not really want to fight a war with China either and that was the event the United States seized upon to intervene against Japan, disapproval over the war in China. However, while Japanese forces had been fighting in China for about ten years, Japan had never declared war on China and the Republic of China did not declare war on Japan until after Britain and America had done so. At least as far as Japan was concerned, this was because Japan hoped that the "China Incident" could be ended. Japan hoped to come to some sort of agreement with the Chinese nationalists and was only concerned with the danger posed by the communist faction that had been gaining strength and was backed by powerful foreign interests.

The trouble in China began with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, something which the Japanese did not start but which was probably provoked by Chinese communists because it served only their interests for Japan and the Chinese nationalists to go to war with each other. Later, during the talks between Japan and the United States to try to keep the peace between the two countries, one of the American demands was that the Japanese military forces be removed from China. This was something that Japan was prepared to agree to with the only concession being that a small force be left behind to deal with the communist threat which was all Japan was concerned about anyway. The problem was that there was a misunderstanding over this American proposal that was not clarified until after the war. The Japanese thought that the United States were demanding that the Japanese withdraw from Manchuria as well (which was then the Empire of Manchukuo) as the United States still considered Manchuria to belong to China. However, this was actually not the case and tragically it was only after the war that the Japanese learned that America did not mean to demand that they withdraw from Manchuria as well.

Communism was on the march in East Asia and Japan had every reason to be concerned. The Soviet Union had reached across Siberia to the Pacific, had taken control of Outer Mongolia, threatened Manchuria and was supporting the communists in China. Even the League of Nations commission led by the Earl of Lytton admitted that Japan had legitimate concerns about defending itself from expansionist communism. The Japanese civil and military leadership kept hoping that the fighting in China would end, hoping that the next victory would finally compel Chiang Kai-shek to come to terms and stop the fighting so they could focus on the communist threat. Even though the United States had taken a very pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese attitude, the government in Tokyo expressed its willingness for the United States to be the mediator in bringing about a peaceful settlement of the hostilities between China and Japan. Unfortunately, the Roosevelt government did not appreciate the threat that the Chinese communists represented. Among the international community, it was really only the Empire of Japan that recognized how great a danger Mao's communists posed to the peace and stability of East Asia.

The sad fact that no one else recognized this danger until it was too late and the Empire of Japan, which had been the best bulwark against communist expansion in Asia, was devastated by war. On the part of Japan, mistakes were certainly made regarding China though most of them were not a part of any official government policy. The only one which was probably an official mistake was the support for the Wang Jingwei government. He was not a very trustworthy fellow and the recognition of his government made it all but impossible for Chiang Kai-shek to ever come to terms with Japan. However, as far as the United States is concerned, the great mistake was in not recognizing the communist threat and going to war against the one country best equipped to deal with that threat. Fortunately, better late than never, the United States has learned the lesson. Of course, expecting any country to retract part of what has become the national narrative would be expecting too much but American actions speak louder than words and those actions indicate clearly that the lessons of the war in East Asia have been learned. Certainly, coming to this understanding has been helped by the fact that Communist China today is too powerful and too threatening to ignore. Today, unlike in 1941, the United States opposes Communist China and supports Japan as well as strengthening the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the reinterpretation of the constitution to allow for collective self-defense.

Today, just like in those early days of communist aggression in East Asia, the Red Chinese are looking to expand and they are being supported by an expansionist Russia. However, this time Japan is not standing alone but has the pledged support of the United States as well as more friendly relations with almost every country in the region not being dominated by Red China. Tensions with South Korea are certainly problematic but in the worst case scenario they would have no choice but to join the non-communist powers opposing China or be dominated by the bandit government in Peking. As Communist China has become more aggressive and continues to build up its navy as a major offensive weapon, it is more important than ever to strengthen the ties of all the Pacific countries to form a defensive cordon around Red China. The Empire of Japan was the first to recognize the threat but everyone else can see it now and most are responding accordingly.