A Priestly Plan for Japanese and East Asian Security

Bishop Walsh

Prior to the outbreak of the Greater East Asian War, an attempt at Japanese-American reconciliation was made on the initiative of two Catholic priests; Bishop James E. Walsh, (a veteran of much missionary work in China) Superior General of the Maryknoll Society, and his assistant Father James M. Drought. It is important to note the experience Bishop Walsh had in China and his understanding of the threat posed by the communist insurgency (something which many in the United States did not understand). These two men were convinced that the rising tensions between Japan and the United States were ill-founded and unnecessary and that a lasting peace could be arranged by reasonable men on both sides of the Pacific. Knowing the threat posed by the communists in China and recognizing that Japan was the only power placed to deal with this crisis, they hoped that the Roosevelt administration in Washington DC could be shown that, far from being a problem, Japan was the solution in East Asia that America should support.

The two priests traveled to Tokyo and met with Tadao Ikawa, one of the directors of the Central Agricultural and Forestry Bank. They presented him with a memorandum which proposed a Japanese “Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine”. This, of course, was a reference to the Monroe Doctrine which established the American foreign policy that the United States would be neutral to existing European colonies in the Americas but would resist any effort by European powers to interfere in the affairs of the Americas to expand their colonial rule or hinder the newly independent countries established in Central and South America. It laid the ground work for the “special relationship” between the United States and Great Britain and essentially said that if there were any problems or threats in the Americas it would be the United States that would deal with them and not any non-American powers. The two Catholic priests proposed something similar with the Empire of Japan taking the position in East Asia that the United States took in the Americas.

Look! The cruel injustice of the Communists!

This would mean that the colonial holdings of Europe (the only American holding being The Philippines which was being given its independence) were not to be molested but could not be expanded and that no non-Asian powers could meddle in the affairs of East Asian countries. The Empire of Japan would be responsible for maintaining peace and order in the region and if any problems in East Asia should arise it would be Japan that would deal with them with no interference by non-Asian powers. If this should have also led to a “special relationship” between Japan and the United States, that would probably have been something the priests would have looked forward to. However, there was no doubt that the first problem that had to be dealt with was the spread of communism in China and the two Catholic clerics were adamant that Japan should be supported in taking the initiative to stop this “corroding social disease”, as the memorandum called it, before it became an “epidemic”. Ikawa had worked in the United States as part of the Finance Ministry and was impressed by the idea and confident that Japan would agree to it.

Colonel Iwakuro

The priests assured the Japanese officials that they had the support of leading men in America, which the Japanese assumed to mean President Roosevelt, which was not true, nonetheless Ikawa took the priests to meet with Prime Minister Prince Konoye and Foreign Minister Matsuoka. The Prince sent them to the War Ministry to speak to Colonel Hideo Iwakuro who was known for his position that an alliance with America would be the key to success for Japan. He was also an expert intelligence officer who had set up the Nakano School for intelligence agents and who had saved the lives of five thousand Jewish refugees by allowing them into Manchuria, persuading the Kwantung Army leadership that as it had been a Jewish-American firm that loaned Japan the money needed to win the war against Russia, abandoning them would be dishonorable. He introduced the priests to General Akira Muto, head of the Military Affairs Bureau who approved of their plan and gave it his full support.

At the start of 1941 the two priests returned to America in the hope of finding as much support in Washington as they had in Tokyo. Their first supporter was the Postmaster General, Frank C. Walker, one of the most prominent Catholics in America. He arranged for the priests to finally meet with President Roosevelt and Bishop Walsh presented his memorandum to the President. Unfortunately, when it came to Japan, Roosevelt seemed unwilling to ever take any action without the approval of his Secretary of State Cordell Hull who had an undeniable prejudice against Japan. Hull voiced skepticism in a note written by his senior advisor on Far Eastern Affairs Dr. Stanley Hornbeck who was one of the most anti-Japanese and pro-Chinese members of the administration. Still, Roosevelt empowered Walker to act as his agent in pursuing the idea. Likewise, in Japan, Colonel Iwakuro was dispatched to the United States with the support of General Hideki Tojo. He went to St Patrick’s Cathedral in New York City and met with Bishop Walsh where he was met with the disappointing news that the Roosevelt administration had decided that the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy prevented any such American agreement with Japan and Japan would not betray German and Italy. Colonel Iwakuro was also met with resistance by the Japanese diplomats in America who saw his actions as the Imperial Army interfering in matters that should be handled by their own office.

As negotiations went on the original intent of the memorandum, of the Japanese “Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine” was all but forgotten as the focus shifted almost entirely to China and the proposal that Japan withdraw all troops from China in exchange for the Republic of China recognizing the independence of the Empire of Manchukuo and forming a sort of coalition government with the rival regime of Wang Ching-wei. The American State Department, under Hull, rejected the proposal almost completely. To make matters worse, however, Hull gave the Japanese ambassador, Admiral Nomura, the impression that the proposal would be a basis for future negotiations when in fact he had no intention of doing so and the result was a long, fruitless series of negotiations or attempted negotiations that achieved nothing but to increase bitterness in Japan that the Roosevelt administration was not acting in good faith but was simply trying to put off the Japanese while Japan grew weaker and American forces in the region grew stronger. Which was, sadly, entirely correct. However, why does this history matter to us today? What can we learn from the peace efforts of two Catholic priests in 1941?

The relevance of this to the present time is that the basic idea put forward in their memorandum, of a “Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine” supervised by Japan is a viable foreign policy position today. In fact, there is far more likelihood of such a policy being workable today or at least in the near future than there was in 1941. The biggest question today would be whether or not the Japanese people are willing to take up the responsibility for East Asia. If there is the will in Japan to pursue such a policy, there is no reason why it could not be implemented. Unlike in 1941, there seems little doubt that such a move would have the full backing of the United States, Great Britain, Australia and most of the Southeast Asian countries. Of course, colonialism is no longer an issue but those portions could be replaced with similar assurances dealing with existing defensive alliances. Also, just as in the original memorandum, the preeminent focus of such a doctrine would be the communist forces in China who, unhappily, now happen to control much more than they did in 1941. Suppressing them would not be immediately possible but such a doctrine would allow for the containment of their expansionist impulses and a revived and involved Japan would be the power best placed to do it.

The biggest difference between today and 1941 is that the danger of Communist China has been demonstrated. In 1941, few of the major powers other than Japan took the threat seriously. The United States, most importantly, saw the China Incident only as the Japanese on one side and China on the other whereas, in fact, the Japanese government stated a willingness to make peace with the nationalists, even for the United States to broker that peace, and withdraw from China (Manchukuo being independent) so long as Japanese forces remained where necessary to deal with the communist insurgency. The United States chose to take the side of China and oppose Japan, the other major powers following along. However, though the American government would never openly admit it, American policy and actions have demonstrated that they understand that this was a mistake because today the United States supports Japan and opposes China, even more so than the Republic of China on Taiwan. Whereas in 1941 the Roosevelt administration was suspicious of Japan, today both the major political parties in the United States have welcomed the new policy of collective self-defense proposed by Prime Minister Abe and have encouraged Japan to strengthen the Self-Defense Forces. Today, the United States wants Japan to play a larger part in ensuring the peace and stability of East Asia.

This would be the perfect time for Japan to begin the shift to this new doctrine. The support for collective self-defense measures has been growing and more people on both sides of the Pacific have wanted Japan to take a more active part in its own self-defense. Japan is also protected by the most powerful and advanced military in the world, the United States, and so would be able to build up its own military strength in safety until fully prepared to take on this larger responsibility for the region. Australia has expressed its support for Japan strengthening the armed forces and other countries in the region could be expected to go along with it due to the growing fears of communist Chinese expansion. Under this doctrine it would be the duty of a revitalized Japan to keep communist aggression contained and to deal with any problems in East Asia that pose a threat to the security and stability of the region. The recent increased closeness between Russia and China would also be a reason why America and Europe would probably support such a doctrine for a more prominent Japan to keep watch over the region. To put it in terms that the two priests in 1941 might appreciate, Japan would be the “guardian angel” of East Asia in the same way that the United States is in the Americas and NATO is in Europe. Given the political climate of today, there is no reason why such a plan could not work, it would only require the Japanese public to be awakened to supporting a much larger and more assertive role for Japan on the world stage.